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THE POLITICS OF TRASH
I. INTRODUCTION
In the late 1990s, a dispute between Virginia and New
York City concerning the export of the City's garbage to Virginia's
landfills touched off a national discussion about the interstate
transport of municipal solid waste (MSW) in the United States.
While the controversy has since died down, the flow of MSW
across state lines and the resulting environmental and social
difficulties continue. Using the Virginia - New York City
controversy as an example, this Note will analyze whether the
interstate transport of MSW presents an environmental problem
worth addressing, and if so, in what manner. Section II of this
Note will discuss the background of the Virginia - New York
garbage dispute. Sections III and IV will explain the ways in
which the U.S. Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) may promote the interstate transport of MSW and
encourage disputes among different states and/or cities. Section V
will provide specific data about the landfilling and transport of
MSW in Virginia, and Section VI and VII will explore some of the
negative environmental and social externalities associated with the
interstate transport of waste from New York to Virginia. In light
of these externalities, Sections VIII and IX will look at some
potential federal and state legal solutions that might help address
the problems associated with the interstate transport of MSW.
Section X will offer a concluding set of recommendations.
II. THE VIRGINIA - NEW YORK GARBAGE DISPUTE
In November of 1996, New York City announced plans to
close the Fresh Kills Landfill on Staten Island by 2001.1 Fresh
Kills-a 3000 acre landfill that accepted 13,000 tons of garbage
per day in the 1990s-first started accepting the City's garbage in
21948. From the 1940s until the 1990s, the City's residentialgarbage was disposed of exclusively at Fresh Kills or at other
I Vivian S. Toy, Planning to Close Its Landfills, New York Will Export Trash,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1996, at Al.
2 id
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smaller landfills in one of the City's five boroughs. 3 To deal with
the impending lack of landfill capacity resulting from the closure
of Fresh Kills, the City also announced plans to export residential
garbage to other states, including Virginia.
4
It did not take long for the implementation of New York
City's export plan to create a political controversy in Virginia. By
1999, the City was exporting 2400 tons of garbage per day to
Virginia.5  Additionally, Waste Management Inc., the waste-
hauling company that exported most of New York's trash to
Virginia, announced plans to invest fifteen million dollars to ship
MSW on barges to Virginia landfills. 6  Concerned with the
increasing flow of waste from New York City, Virginia's then-
Governor Jim Gilmore threatened a ban on garbage arriving in the
state on barges.7 In response, New York City's then-Mayor Rudy
Giuliani suggested that states like Virginia should accept the City's
trash in exchange for the enjoyment of the City's many cultural
attractions. 8 Giuliani's comments prompted a highly-publicized
response letter from Gilmore that decried the increasing shipments
3 According to New York City officials, prior to the closure of the Fresh Kills
landfill, the last time any trash was shipped outside the city was in the 1930s,
when the federal government ordered New York City to stop dumping trash in
the Atlantic Ocean. Toy, supra note 1. From 1991 until 1996, the landfill was
the City's only repository for residential garbage. Id.
4 Id. The export plan initially identified Ohio and Virginia as possible
destinations for New York City's garbage. Prophetically, Michael McKenna,
the then-policy director for the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality,
commented that Virginia "really has no mechanism to prevent the import of
garbage from elsewhere... But when large volumes of waste begin to flow from
New York, it's likely to cause Virginians to reconsider where they are on the
issue of [trash] import." Id.
' Vivian S. Toy, Trash, Giuliani Tells Virginia, Is Good Deal, Not Obligation,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1999, at B5.
6 Blaine Harden, Trade Trash For Culture? Not Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18,
1999, at B3.
7 Andy Newman, Giuliani's Trash-for-Culture Deal Doesn't Play in Virginia,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 1999, at B3.
8 On January 13, 1999, Mayor Giuliani "outlined his vision of a 'reciprocal
relationship': three million people a day visit the city for culture and business,
and some of the considerable amount of garbage they generate should follow
them back home, especially once the Fresh Kills landfill in Staten Island closes
in 2001." Id.
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of New York City's waste to Virginia's landfills and suggested that
the City transport its garbage to other landfill facilities in the
Northeast.
9
The Giuliani-Gilmore quarrel prompted politicians,
industry representatives, and citizens to weigh in on the political
controversy. Some Virginia politicians spoke out in support of
Gilmore. l0 Giuliani, waste industry officials, and even some local
Virginia politicians countered criticisms of the export plans by
emphasizing the economic benefits that Virginia localities received
for accepting New York City's trash. 1 As a result of all the
political back-and-forth, Virginia residents who might not have
otherwise been aware of the increasing export of trash from New
York City to Virginia became increasingly tuned in to the issue.
12
The political spat between Giuliani and Gilmore also
touched off a heightened national focus on the potential problems
associated with the interstate transport of MSW. Just several
months after the New York-Virginia dispute made the news, the
Senate Committee on the Environment and Public Works held a
legislative hearing on MSW and local flow control. 13 And in 1999,
at least eight different bills giving states or localities some degree
9 Letter from James S. Gilmore, II, Governor, Commw. of Va., to Rudolph W.
Giuliani, Mayor, City of N.Y., (Jan. 15, 1999) (on file with the Library of Va.),
available at
http://web.archive.org/web/20001207210000/www.state.va.us/governor/newsre/
guil01 15.htm.
10 See, e.g., Harden, supra note 6.
11 See Toy, supra note 5 (Giuliani "said that after Governor Gilmore made his
comments, three local politicians from Virginia called the Mayor's Office
'saying the Governor is displaying his viewpoint, but at the same time about
four or five thousand jobs depend on [exports] and we have a more practical
approach."'). Deputy New York City Mayor Joseph Lhota claimed that "[t]he
only people who are objecting to this lucrative business are pandering politicians
trying to achieve their own agenda." Newman, supra note 7.
12 Harden, supra note 6 (noting that Giuliani's controversial comments were
"uniquely effective in crystallizing attitudes towards big-city garbage in the
minds of average Virginians.").
13 JAMES E. MCCARTHY, SCI. AND INDUS. Div., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., REP.
1B10002, SOLID WASTE ISSUES IN THE 106TH CONGRESS (Apr. 27, 2000),
available at http://www.ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/waste/waste-27.cfm.
2008-20091
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of control over the importation of out-of-state waste were
introduced in Congress. 14
While the media and academic attention concerning the
interstate transport of MSW has since died down, the underlying
problems that sparked the controversy have not disappeared. As
later sections of this Note will show, states remain relatively
powerless to restrict the flow of interstate waste shipments, and the
amount of trash exported from Virginia to New York remains
higher than ever. The following section will describe the ways in
which the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence may promote such conditions.
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The New York-Virginia garbage dispute is just one
example of struggles among various states to control the interstate
flow of MSW in the United States. Long before the closure of the
Fresh Kills landfill, many states and localities struggled to find
ways to limit the flow of garbage across their borders in light of
the U.S. Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence.
The Commerce Clause states that "Congress shall have the
power.. .to regulate Commerce.. .among the several states.""5 This
affirmative constitutional grant to Congress is construed by the
Court as a necessary limit on states' ability to regulate interstate
commerce. 16 In ruling that state or local laws that discriminate
14 Id.
15 U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16 See, e.g., United Haulers Ass 'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth.,
550 U.S. 330 (2007) (remarking that although the Constitution does not
explicitly limit the power of the states to regulate commerce, the Supreme Court
has long-interpreted the Commerce Clause as an implicit restraint on state
authority even in the absence of a federal statute). See also Rachel D. Baker, C
& A Carbone v. Clarkstown: A Wake-Up Call for the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 5 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 67, 71 (1995) (stating that "the Court has
been particularly critical of state regulations that benefit the enacting state to the
detriment of other states."). The original purpose of the Commerce Clause was
to discourage states from taking self-interested measures to gain economic
advantages over other states. The Supreme Court has sought to protect the
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against interstate commerce violate the Commerce Clause, the
Court aims to prohibit state or local laws whose object is local
economic protectionism. 17 The Court also holds that solid waste,
even if it has no real commercial value, is still an article of
commerce for the purposes of the Commerce Clause.' 8 As the
cases below will illustrate, because waste is a form of commerce,
states and localities have very little power to control the
importation of waste from other jurisdictions.
A. Philadelphia v. New Jersey
In Philadelphia v. New Jersey, the Court struck down as a
violation of the dormant Commerce Clause a New Jersey statute
that banned virtually all out-of-state waste. 19 In striking down the
law, the Court relied on a two-step dormant Commerce Clause
analysis first applied in Pike v. Bruce Church. Under that test, a
state regulation that discriminates against interstate commerce on
its face or in its effect is per se invalid. If the state regulation does
not discriminate against interstate commerce on its face or in its
effect, and if the regulation is "evenhanded" and affects commerce
only incidentally, then it will survive challenge "unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits" of the regulation.
20
original purpose by attempting to prevent the state-level factionalism that the
Framers' sought to prevent. Id.
17 C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1993).
18 Ft. Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Mich. Dep't of Natural Res., 504 U.S. 353
(1992) (reasoning that just as Congress has the power to regulate the interstate
movement of MSW, states are not free from constitutional scrutiny when they
restrict such movement).
19 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
20 Id. at 624 ("Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a
legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. . . . If a legitimate
local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent
of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities.").
2008-20091
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The Court did not go beyond the first step of the Pike v.
Bruce Church test. It held that the New Jersey statute was per se
invalid because it facially discriminated against interstate
commerce. 2 1 In light of this holding, several states began to devise
new and creative restrictions on out-of-state waste. As the
following cases will show, most of these attempts were also struck
down by the Court as per se invalid under the dormant Commerce
Clause.
B. The 1990s Garbage Cases
In Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Department
of Natural Resources, the Court held that waste importation
restrictions levied on local (as opposed to state) lines were also per
se invalid.22 Specifically, the Court struck down a Michigan law
that prohibited any person from accepting for disposal any solid
waste that was not generated in the locality in which the disposal
area was located unless the acceptance of such waste was
specifically authorized by the locality's approved solid waste
management plan.23 The Court rejected Michigan's argument that
the statute constituted a comprehensive health and safety
regulation rather than a form of economic protectionism because
the state failed to prove that its importation restrictions furthered
health and safety concerns that could not be served by other non-
discriminatory alternatives. 24 The Court also relied on the fact (as
it did in Philadelphia v. New Jersey) that Michigan failed to
provide any reasons (aside from difference in origin) why out-of-
county solid waste should be treated any differently from in-county
solid waste.
25
In 1994, the Court struck down two more attempts to
control or limit the flow of MSW. First, the state of Oregon's
21 Id. at 628 (holding that the New Jersey statute, "[o]n its face... imposes on
out-of-state commercial interests the full burden of conserving the State's
remaining landfill space," and relying on the fact that New Jersey "overtly
moved to slow or freeze the flow of commerce for protectionist reasons").
22 504 U.S. 353, 355 (1992).
23 id.
24 [d. at 361.
25 Id.
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attempt to impose a surcharge on the disposal of out-of-state solid
waste in Oregon landfills was struck down as per se invalid in
Oregon Waste Systems v. Oregon Department of Environmental
Quality.26 Later, in C & A Carbone v. Clarkstown, the Court
invalidated a New York town's flow control ordinance, which,
under an agreement between the town and a private waste
contractor, required that all solid waste generated inside the town
(or generated outside the town and brought into the town) be
processed at a designated transfer station within the town.
27
In Oregon Waste Systems, the Court held that the Oregon
surcharge on out-of-state waste shipments was facially
discriminatory and noted that there was no suggestion by the state
of any safety, health, or environmental reasons unique to out-of-
state MSW for preventing the flow of such waste into the state.
28
The Court also rejected Oregon's attempt to justify the surcharge
as a form of "resource protection"-holding that even if the
surcharge conserved more space for waste generated within the
state, the surcharge was not constitutionally valid.29
The Court held that the flow control ordinance at issue in
Carbone violated the Commerce Clause because it deprived out-
of-state competitor firms of access to the local waste market.
30
The Court relied on the fact that the town had non-discriminatory
alternatives, such as uniform non-discriminatory safety regulations,
for addressing the health and environmental problems targeted by
the flow control ordinance.
31
C. Flow Control Revisited: Oneida-Herkimer
The Court never addressed the constitutionality of state or
local attempts to restrict the import or export of MSW until
thirteen years after Carbone, in United Haulers Association v.
26 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
27 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994).
28 511 U.S. at 100-101.
29 Id. at 107.
30511 U.S. 383.
31 id
2008-20091
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Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Authority.32 There, the Court
examined the flow control ordinances of Oneida and Herkimer
counties, both in New York. The ordinances required all solid
waste generated within the two counties to be delivered to the
processing facilities of the Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority-a state-created public benefit
corporation. 33  Although the Court struck down under the
Commerce Clause a flow control ordinance that forced waste
haulers to deliver waste to a particular private waste processing
facility in Carbone, it upheld the Oneida and Herkimer ordinances,
primarily on the grounds that the haulers were required to bring
waste to the facilities of a state-created public benefit
corporation.
34
To support its ruling, the Court distinguished state entities,
such as municipal waste authorities, from private businesses, such
as commercial waste haulers. 35 The Court concluded that because
the government, unlike private enterprise, is responsible for
protecting the health, safety, and well-being of its citizens, laws
favoring local government and laws favoring private industry
should not be viewed with equal skepticism. 36 Thus, laws favoring
in-state business over out-of-state business are subject to rigorous
scrutiny, while laws favoring local government are not.37 Based on
the conclusion that a law favoring a public entity like the Oneida-
Herkimer Waste Authority and treating all private entities the same
does not discriminate against interstate commerce as does a law
favoring local businesses, the Court upheld the flow control
ordinances.
38
32 A Lexis-Nexis database search conducted in April 2008 of Supreme Court
cases containing the terms "flow control" or "municipal solid waste" &
"dormant commerce clause" turned up zero results between 1995 and 2007.
31 United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth, 550 U.S.
330, 336-37 (2007).
14 Id. at 334.
" Id. at 335.
36 id.
37 Id. at 342-43 (also noting that "[t]he contrary approach of treating public and
private entities the same under the dormant Commerce Clause would lead to
unprecedented and unbounded interference by the courts with state and local
government").
381d. at 1797.
THE POLITICS OF TRASH
D. Summary
Bans on out-of-state or out-of-county waste are plainly
unconstitutional under the Court's dormant Commerce Clause
analysis, as are discriminatory tipping fees imposed upon out-of-
state waste haulers. A flow control ordinance that requires garbage
generated within a locality to be disposed of at that county's
facility is unconstitutional if executed pursuant to an agreement
between a locality and a private entity. Flow control ordinances
that require solid waste generated within a county to be delivered
to that county's publicly-operated solid waste authority's facilities,
however, are constitutional.
While Oneida-Herkimer puts a slight wrinkle in the Court's
garbage jurisprudence, it is still fair to say that "in the absence of
congressional action, the Court is committed to the free flow of
waste across state and local boundaries." 39 The next section of this
Note will explore the ways in which Congress may have also
influenced the interstate exchange of MSW with the enactment and
implementation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
IV. REGULATION OF MSW LANDFILLS UNDER RCRA
In addition to the Supreme Court's dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, the practice of interstate waste transport in
the United States has been partially influenced by the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA). Under RCRA, MSW
landfills are primarily regulated by state, tribal, and local
governments, but the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) sets minimal national standards that landfills must meet to
remain in operation. 40 The federal requirements applicable to all
MSW landfills in all states under RCRA Subtitle D include
location restrictions, composite liners, leachate collection and
removal systems, specific operating practices, groundwater
39 Robert R.M. Verchick, The Commerce Clause, Environmental Justice, and the
Interstate Garbage Wars, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1250 (1997).
40 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6942-6944 (2008); see also U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
RCRA ORIENTATION MANUAL 2006, at 1-4 (2006).
2008-20091
66 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
monitoring, closure and post-closure care, corrective action plans,
and financial assurance.41
Subtitle D of RCRA was enacted in 1988 and represented
the first set of nationally-applicable federal requirements for
landfills.4 2  As a result, the fixed costs of landfill operation
increased substantially, and privately-run, large-capacity "mega-
fills" proliferated.43  Between 1988 and 1999, the number of
landfills in the United States decreased from about 10,000 mostly
smaller municipal-run landfills to an estimated 3500 newer, larger-
capacity landfills.44 In this sense, Subtitle D, in addition to the
Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, may be fueling
the increased interstate exchange of MSW in the United States. As
privately-operated mega-fills pop up in communities across the
country, and as landfill operators distribute their increased fixed
costs over a larger client base and take in increasing amounts of
solid waste, there is a much greater market for the interstate
exchange of waste when compared to the period prior to 1988.
While it certainly may not have been their intention, both
the Supreme Court and Congress have had an influential hand in
fueling the robust interstate exchange of MSW in the United
States. The next section of this Note will illustrate how this robust
interstate exchange of MSW has played out on the ground in
Virginia, with a special focus on the factors fueling the importation
of waste from New York City.
V. MSW DISPOSAL & IMPORTATION IN VIRGINIA
A. Statistical Data
According to the Virginia Department of Environmental
Quality (DEQ), during calendar year 2006, 16.77 million tons of
MSW (33.54 billion pounds) were received at Virginia's permitted
4 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6942-6944 (2008).
42 David Taylor, Talking Trash: The Economic and Environmental Issues of
Landfills, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A404, A404 (1999).
4, Id. at A405. In order to be economically sustainable, landfill operators had to
distribute their higher fixed costs "over a larger client base by taking in a larger
volume of solid waste." Id.
44 [d.
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solid waste management facilities. 45 Of that amount, over one-
third came from out-of-state sources.46 Of this out-of-state waste,
most was from five jurisdictions: Maryland (42.7%), New York
(24.5%), Washington, D.C. (17.1%), North Carolina (6.9%), and
New Jersey (5.2%).47 New York's 24.5% amounted to 1.69
million tons (3.38 billion pounds) of MSW during 2006 alone. 48
Since 2000, the amount of out-of-state MSW imported in
Virginia has been on the rise. Virginia received 3.89 million tons
of MSW from out-of-state sources in 2000-one year after the
Giuliani-Gilmore political quarrel. In 2006, that figure increased
to 5.74 million tons-the second highest annual amount on
record. 49 The amount of waste imported into Virginia in 2004 was
slightly higher (5.89 million tons).5 °
B. Potential Reasons for Transport of Waste to
Virginia
A variety of hypotheses help explain why Virginia receives
so much trash from other states. One explanation for the high level
of imports from Maryland and Washington, D.C. is self-evident.
Washington, D.C. is geographically much smaller and more urban
than Virginia, and thus has nowhere to go with its MSW, aside
from neighboring states. While Maryland certainly has some rural
areas, its population is more dense and urban than Virginia's, and
the state consequently has much less land available for landfills.
51
45 VA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, SOLID WASTE MANAGED IN VIRGINIA
DURING CALENDAR YEAR 2006, at i (2007) [hereinafter DEQ SOLID WASTE
REPORT].
46 Id. About eleven million tons originated in Virginia, while over 5.74 million
tons originated in other jurisdictions. Id.
47 Id.
4
1Id. at7.
49 Id. at 13.
50 id.
51 U.S. Census Bureau, State and County QuickFacts,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/ (last visited Apr. 24, 2009). In 2000,
Maryland's population density was at 541.9 persons per square mile, while
Virginia's was at 178.8 persons per square mile. Maryland's land area was
9,773.82 square miles, while Virginia's land area was over four times that size,
at 39,594.07 square miles. Id.
2008-20091
68 BUFFALO ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16
The availability of relatively cheap, sparsely populated
rural land in southeast Virginia has attracted a number of large
capacity "mega-fills" 52 that accept MSW from Maryland, D.C.,
North Carolina, New York, and elsewhere. Of Virginia's fourteen
mega-fills, most are concentrated in the relatively rural
southeastern part of the state, 53 where localities tend to be land-rich
and cash-poor.54 This makes it economically profitable for waste
companies like Waste Management, Inc. and Allied Waste
Industries 55 to haul trash from Maryland, D.C., and North Carolina
to Virginia landfills.
A variety of other reasons also help explain why Virginia
might receive so much of New York's MSW. Perhaps the most
obvious reason is that New York City closed Fresh Kills landfill in
2001 and consequently lost its biggest source of disposal
capacity. 56  The City probably does not export a great deal of
garbage to landfills in other, more western parts of the state
52 There is no official EPA or DEQ definition of a mega-fill. For the purposes of
this Note, a Virginia mega-fill is defined as a landfill that either: had ten million
tons of remaining capacity available as of December 2006, or landfilled greater
than two percent of the total amount of MSW landfilled in Virginia in 2006
(280,000 tons per year). Based on the DEQ statistics available in Attachment
Seven of the DEQ Solid Waste Report, this criteria sweeps in fourteen landfills.
See DEQ SOLID WASTE REPORT, supra note 45, at 30-31. These landfills are
located in the counties of Amelia, Brunswick, Charles City, Chesterfield,
Fairfax, Gloucester, Hampton, Henrico, King and Queen, King George, Loudon,
Shenandoah, Suffolk, and Sussex. See VA. DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, SOLID
WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES IN VIRGINIA (2007). Complete statistics on
every Virginia landfill and the host communities' demographic characteristics
were obtained from the DEQ SOLID WASTE REPORT, supra note 45, and the U.S.
Census Bureau's QuickFacts website, supra note 51. A closer analysis of these
statistics and their potential implications will be provided infra, Part VII.
53 Eleven of the fourteen mega-fills are located in the central-southeastern
portion of the state. The large southeastern county mega-fills accept the
majority of New York City's garbage. See Harden, supra note 6.
54 For a more in-depth discussion of the economic plight of southeastern
Virginia mega-fill host communities, see infra Part VII.
55 Waste Management and Allied own most of the mega-fills throughout
southeastern Virginia, including the mega-fills in Brunswick, Charles City,
Gloucester, Hampton, King and Queen, King George, and Henrico. See VA.
DEP'T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT FACILITIES IN
VIRGINIA (2007).
56 See Toy, supra note 1.
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because the state's facilities do not have much capacity. As of
2007, there were only twenty-seven active landfills in the New
York. These landfills accepted 7.8 million tons of solid waste in
2006-compared with the 25.1 million tons of solid waste
accepted by Virginia's sixty-eight solid waste landfills in the same
year.57 While Virginia landfilled more than three times the solid
waste that New York did in 2006, New York's population is over
two and a half times the size of Virginia's population. 58 The fact
that New York has more people producing more waste and
comparatively less in-state disposal options helps explain why so
much of the state's trash ends up in Virginia landfills.
A closer analysis, however, reveals a combination of
different factors that may explain the disparity in landfill capacity
between Virginia and New York. These factors also help explain
why it is probably much cheaper to locate a landfill in Virginia
when compared with New York. To the extent that it is
significantly cheaper to locate a landfill in Virginia or elsewhere,
private waste companies lack strong incentives to site new landfills
in New York.
First, it may be cheaper to landfill in Virginia because New
York's MSW disposal requirements are significantly more
stringent. New York, for example, requires a double composite
liner system, 59 while Virginia only requires a single liner.
60
Another difference is that New York requires both primary and
secondary leachate collection systems, whereas Virginia only
requires a primary leachate collection system. The extra time,
money, and resources needed to construct these control measures
in New York can only drive up the cost of building and running a
landfill in the state when compared to Virginia.
Second, it may also be more expensive for a landfill located
in New York because local property taxes are likely higher, on
average, than they are in Virginia. While Virginia taxes personal
57 See DEQ SOLID WASTE REPORT, supra note 45, at i, 30-32.
58 U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 51 (estimating Virginia's 2006 population to
be 7.6 million, compared to New York's 2006 population estimate of 19.3
million).
59 N.Y.COMP. CODES. R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 360-2 (2008), available at
http://www.dec.ny.gov/regs/14639.html.
60 9 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-80-250 (2008).
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and real property, New York only taxes real property. 6 1  To
provide local services, communities in New York must necessarily
tax real property at relatively higher rates than communities in
Virginia. Relatively higher property taxes could be another
powerful incentive for private landfills to choose to locate in
Virginia or other states instead of New York.
Finally, it may also be costlier and more difficult to site
landfills in the more rural and relatively wealthier western
communities of New York because of the presence of politically
powerful NIMBY groups. 62 Because these communities have a
stronger tax base to fund schools and other public services, their
residents do not have such strong economic incentives to accept
large landfills-in contrast to some of the host communities in
southeast Virginia.
As the next sections of this Note will show, the interstate
transport of waste from New York to Virginia has wrought several
negative environmental and social problems-regardless of the
underlying reasons driving the phenomenon. The next two
sections will explore some of these negative externalities in closer
detail.
V1. ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH RISKS
To analyze whether the flow of trash from New York to
Virginia presents an example of a problem that should be
addressed at the federal or state level, it is first necessary to
explore the seriousness of the environmental and human health
risks associated with the disposal of MSW. This Section will
illustrate some of the negative externalities associated with the
proliferation of mega-fills and the interstate exchange of MSW,
including the inadvertent disposal of harmful or hazardous waste in
MSW landfills, the potential for groundwater contamination,
traffic safety hazards, and air pollution.
61 Office of Real Property Services, New York State, Real Property Tax Primer,
http://www.orps.state.ny.us/primer/assessments.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
62 The Concerned Citizens of Cattaraugus County is just one community group
that has successfully lodged organized opposition against landfill siting in
western New York in the past. See Concerned Citizens of Cattaraugus County,
http://concernedcitizens.homestead.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
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A. Inadvertent Disposal of Harmful and Hazardous
Waste
MSW is comprised of residential, commercial, and
institutional garbage, and includes everyday household items like
packaging materials, grass clippings, furniture, clothing, food
scraps, and paper.63  MSW is also comprised of household
hazardous waste (HHW), which includes common but potentially
harmful items like paint, paint thinner, batteries, varnish,
pesticides, insecticides, and herbicides. 64 While the EPA does not
officially track the percentage of HHW in the typical MSW stream,
available estimates put the figure at less than one percent. 65 More
than 100 hazardous substances listed under RCRA can be found in
HHW, including mercury, lead, silver, benzene, trichloroethylene,
toluene, and parathion.
66
Another potentially harmful waste disposed of in MSW
landfills is electronic waste, or "e-waste." In 2005, 1.9 million
tons of e-waste were dumped primarily in MSW landfills,
according to the EPA.67  While e-waste contains potentially
harmful elements like cadmium, lead, mercury, and other toxins,
the EPA allows it to be thrown in MSW landfills with normal
household trash under the assumption that landfills can safely
manage such products, and on the ground that there has not yet
63 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Municipal Solid Waste,
http://www.epa.gov/msw/facts.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
64 DAN MCGOVERN, THE CAMPO INDIAN LANDFILL WAR: THE FIGHT FOR GOLD
IN CALIFORNIA'S GARBAGE 178-79 (1995).
65 Sorting studies of different cities' and counties' waste streams have estimated
that between 0.35 and 0.40 percent of the total MSW load was hazardous. For a
mega-fill, however, such a small percentage is not insignificant. Id.
66 id.
67 Larry Greenemeier, Trashed Tech: Where Do Old Cell Phones, TVs and PCs
Go to Die?, SC. AM., (Nov. 29, 2007),
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id-trash-tech-pc-tv-waste. Electronic waste
includes unwanted cell phones, televisions, personal computers, computer
peripherals, computer mice, and keyboards. E-waste is growing faster than any
other type of waste regulated by EPA, including medical and industrial waste.
Id.
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been an instance of "contamination of ground water associated
with electronics discarded in landfills."
68
In addition to the normal amounts of HHW and e-waste
received as a matter of course, landfills may also receive other
hazardous, radioactive, or medical waste that is legally required to
be disposed of separately from MSW. According to Virginia state
and county records, medical waste and other hazardous goods have
repeatedly arrived in Virginia landfills from New York, mixed in
with loads of normal household trash.69  Potentially dangerous
illegal waste has been landfilled in Virginia mega-fills from other
jurisdictions as well. In 1992, the state of Delaware notified
Virginia that asbestos and medical waste were regularly discovered
in the trucks of trash haulers en route from Philadelphia to a
Virginia mega-fill. 70  And in a 1996 FBI investigation of
Browning-Ferris Industries (now Allied Waste), three employees
stated that human and animal body parts, blood, radioactive waste,
and chemotherapy chemicals were "inadvertently processed" and
sent to another Virginia mega-fill.7 '
Mega-fills thus present a tradeoff when compared with the
smaller town dumps that dominated in the United States before
Subtitle D. On the one hand, the mega-fills have more
environmental controls and safeguards than the smaller municipal
dumps of the past.72 On the other hand, the mega-fills often take in
much larger amounts of trash from far-away, out-of-state
jurisdictions. The increased loads of waste and longer distances
traveled to dispose of such waste may reduce the level of
accountability and consequently increase the risk that harmful
substances end up in landfills intended for MSW only.
68 Id. (quoting Clare Lindsay, project director for the EPA Office of Solid
Waste's extended product responsibility program).
69 Eric Lipton, As Imported Garbage Piles Up, So Do Worries; 3 Million Tons of
Trash Enter Va. Each Year, WASH. POST, Nov. 12, 1998, at Al. See also Metro
News Briefs: New York; Medical Waste Sent to Virginia Landfill, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 12, 1999; Harden, supra note 6 (noting that "state records documenting the
arrival of untreated syringes and vials of human blood have all raised public
awareness.., about trash rolling into [Virginia] from New York").
70 Lipton, supra note 69.
71 lid
72 See Taylor, supra note 42.
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B. Potential Groundwater Contamination
The disposal of HHW, e-waste, medical waste, and other
potentially hazardous wastes and substances is problematic
because the hazardous elements contained in such wastes can
migrate through a landfill's liner into the groundwater, which is
often relied upon by nearby communities for drinking and
bathing.73 For example, a closed landfill in Loudon County,
Virginia was recently added by the EPA to its National Priorities
List of Superfund sites because it is the probable source of
trichloroethylene contamination in nearby residential wells.
74
Since the contamination made the news, several residents informed
county officials of medical problems, including various types of
cancer. 75  While the Loudon landfill closed in 1984 (before
Subtitle D of RCRA went into effect), instances of liner failure and
groundwater contamination are already popping up at some of
Virginia's newer mega-fills. In 1997, groundwater tests uncovered
elevated levels of lead, chromium, and other substances in one
Virginia mega-fill and elevated levels of antimony in another
mega-fill.76 In 2003, a mega-fill in Suffolk County began regularly
leaking leachate, prompting state inspectors to suspect potential
groundwater contamination beneath the landfill from lead, cobalt,
and beryllium.
77
Despite the potential for groundwater contamination, the
DEQ does not do its own sampling or inspection of groundwater
quality and aquifer resources at landfill sites. In Virginia, landfill
operators are solely responsible for groundwater monitoring and
sampling and must submit monitoring data to the DEQ.78 In light
of the problems highlighted above, one might wonder whether
73 See MCGOVERN, supra note 64.
74 Jonathan Mummolo, Landfill in Loudon Makes List of Most Hazardous U.S.
Sites, WASH. POST, Mar. 20, 2008, at B1.
75 id.
76 Lipton, supra note 69.
77 Scott Harper, Virginia Environmental Quality Officials Warn of Leakagefrom
Suffolk Landfill, VIRGINIAN PILOT, Feb. 14, 2003.
78 E-mail interview with Geoff Christie, Groundwater Program Coordinator,
Office of Solid Waste, Va. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, May 1, 2008.
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entrusting corporate, for-profit waste companies with the
responsibility of monitoring and reporting groundwater
contamination is sound environmental policy, especially
considering the major financial and legal effects that such
companies could face if and when groundwater contamination is
reported.
Furthermore, there may be reason to believe that the EPA's
minimum liner and groundwater monitoring requirements,
applicable to all U.S. landfills, do not provide adequate protection
of groundwater quality in all cases. After conducting extensive
research on Subtitle D liners, one researcher concluded that "the
EPA failed to adequately model the risk of liner failure over time"
and that as a result, individual leaks are unlikely to be detected by
a monitoring well.79 Perhaps only time will tell just how much
protection modem mega-fills provide from groundwater
contamination and other environmental problems, but certainly the
amount of trash disposed of at these sites raises concerns that liners
and leachate collection systems may be overburdened and
consequently crack, potentially releasing contaminants into local
water supplies.
C. Traffic Safety Hazards
The daily migration of trash trucks from New York to
Virginia causes litter, noise and air pollution, and traffic safety
hazards that affect residents across the eastern seaboard. As the
number of Virginia's mega-fills has increased, so has the stream of
truck traffic along Interstate 95 and other Virginia highways.
8 0
Numerous trash hauling companies have been repeatedly ordered
off the road for safety violations, and on a rainy night in 1997, a
trash hauler transporting trash from New York City skidded,
jackknifed, and plowed into rush-hour traffic, killing a retired
couple and injuring seven others. 8 In 1999, eight mid-Atlantic
states, including Virginia and Pennsylvania (the nation's top two
trash-importers), launched "Trashnet," a three-day safety
79 See Taylor, supra note 42.
'0 Lipton, supra note 69.
81 id
.
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crackdown on trash haulers that resulted in over 4000 violation
notices. 82 These serious and potentially life-threatening traffic
safety hazards that accompany interstate MSW transport are in
addition to the "putrid odors and litter that disturb many
communities" in the path of thoroughfares that lead to mega-fills.
83
D. Air Pollution
Landfills are the largest source of methane emissions in the
United States. 84 Methane is a greenhouse gas that contributes to
global climate change. 85  It remains in the atmosphere for
approximately nine to fifteen years and is twenty times more
effective in trapping heat in the atmosphere than carbon dioxide.
86
Methane is generated in landfills as MSW decomposes, and the
amount created by each landfill "depends on the quantity and
moisture content of the waste and the design and management
practices at the site."
87
The transport of waste also contributes to global warming
and air pollution by way of the carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, and
82 Taylor, supra note 42, at 407. Also in 1999, a truck hauling trash from New
York City to a Virginia landfill overturned on an interstate near Richmond,
littering the highway with tons of garbage. Metro News Briefs: New York; New
York Trash Spills On a Virginia Highway, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1999.
83 See Lipton, supra note 69.
84 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Methane: Sources and Emissions,
http://www.epa.gov/methane/sources.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
85 The effects of global climate change are well-documented and beyond the
scope of this Note. For more information, see STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS
OF CLIMATE CHANGE (2006) (projected effects of climate change in the coming
century include, among other things: melting glaciers that will increase flood
risk and reduce water supplies; declining crop yields; malnutrition and heat
stress; increased incidences of vector-borne diseases; species extinctions);
UNITED NATIONS INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS REPORT (2007).
86 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Methane, http://www.epa.gov/methane/index.html
(last visited Apr. 24, 2009).
87 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Methane: Sources and Emissions,
http://www.epa.gov/methane/sources.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2009). The
EPA runs a voluntary program to reduce methane emissions from landfills that
works with private entities and local governments to promote the use of landfill
gas for energy. Id.
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nitrogen oxide emissions from large trash hauling trucks. The
amount of this type of pollution from the transport of solid waste
from New York to Virginia alone is not insignificant. In 2006, 1.6
million tons of MSW were transported from New York to
Virginia." Assuming an average trash hauler transports fifteen
tons of MSW, 112,667 trips from New York to Virginia (and back)
were made by trash haulers in 2006. Using 740 miles as a proxy
example of the round-trip distance between New York City and a
Charles City mega-fill in southeastern Virginia, 83.4 million miles
were driven by New York trash haulers in 2006 alone. This
approximation is just one reason why the transport of waste from
New York to Virginia is an inefficient and environmentally
unsound practice. The 83.4 million miles or more driven by trash
haulers each year is a significant source of air pollution that
contributes to human respiratory problems, haze, ozone formation,
acid rain, and global climate change.
8 9
E. Environmental and Human Health Risks:
Conclusion
The proliferation of mega-fills and the increasing
transportation of MSW from New York to Virginia present an
array of potential environmental and human health problems,
suggesting that a completely unrestrained interstate waste market
presents a form of market failure. As the dumping grounds for the
majority of out-of-state waste, mega-fills carry the currently
unquantified but potentially very serious risk of groundwater
contamination. And partly because mega-fills accept so much
waste from such distant locations, loads of HHW, medical waste,
e-waste, and other potentially dangerous substances are dumped
unregulated into MSW landfills on a daily basis. The practice of
shipping waste from New York to Virginia may be the cheapest
and most economically efficient option available for profit-seeking
waste haulers, but it is not the cheapest and most efficient long
term option for society when the associated negative externalities
88 DEQ SOLID WASTE REPORT, supra note 45, at 7.
89 U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, DIESEL EXHAUST IN THE UNITED STATES (2002),
available at http://www.epa.gov/OMS/retrofit/documents/fO2048.pdf.
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(including increased air pollution, greenhouse gas emissions,
traffic safety hazards, and risk of groundwater contamination for
host communities) are accounted for. The next section of this Note
will take an in-depth look at some potential environmental justice
concerns associated with the transportation of waste from New
York to Virginia.
VII. ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS
As indicated in Section V, most of Virginia's mega-fills are
concentrated in "land-rich, cash-poor" communities in the
southeastern part of the state. News media and academics have
recognized the potential environmental justice problems associated
with the transport of out-of-state trash into these host
communities. 91  This Section will take a closer look at the
demographics of some of the host communities in southeastern
Virginia to determine whether the transport of waste to these
landfills presents an environmental justice problem worth
addressing by some form of public policy.
A. Statistical Evidence
On average, the demographics of Virginia's fourteen mega-
fill counties do not differ markedly from the overall demographics
of the state. As Table One indicates, the median household income
and percentage of persons living below the poverty line are
comparable between the Virginia average and the average of all of
Virginia's mega-fill counties, while the average percentage of
minorities living in all of the state's mega-fill counties is about
seven percent higher.
90 See, e.g., Harden, supra note 6.
91 See, e.g., Harden, supra note 6 (commenting on the "deepening dependence of
central Virginia counties on revenue from landfills" and the Hobbesian choice
faced by prospective host communities); Taylor, supra note 42 (noting that
"most of Virginia's.. .megafills are in rural counties with low average family
incomes."). See also David W. Chen, Luster of New York's Trash Dims in
Virginia, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 1999 at Al.
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TABLE ONE
Percentage Median Percentage Land
of non- household living areabelow (squarepoverty miles)
Virginia
county & 27% $51,103 9.5% 293.2
city
averages
Mega-fill 34% $52,023 9.73% 346.6
counties
These figures, however, are masked by the inclusion of
landfills in Loudon, Shenandoah, and Fairfax counties in the
northern part of the state, and the inclusion of Henrico and
Chesterfield counties in the central part of the state. An analysis of
the demographics of the southeastern Virginia landfills that accept
most of New York City's waste paints a different picture. Table
Two compares the Virginia averages with the demographic
averages of Virginia's nine southeastern mega-fill counties. In
these southeastern counties, the percentage of minorities is much
higher, the median household family income much lower, and the
percentage of persons living below the poverty line lower than that
of the average Virginia locality. The southeastern county statistics
may also be skewed because they are figures from 2006-not from
the year in which a mega-fill was first constructed in the respective
counties. Because mega-fills provide a boon to the local economy
(as detailed below), these 2006 figures may mask even larger
discrepancies in household income and poverty levels that may
have existed in some of these counties before mega-fills were
sited.
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TABLE Two
Percentage Median Percentage Land
of non- household living areabelow (squarepoverty miles)
Virginia
county & 27% $51,103 9.5% 293.2
city
averages
SE VA 40% $43,264 11.62% 306.78
counties
Sussex County is the home of Virginia's largest mega-fill,
which receives about fifty percent of its daily waste load from New
York City. 92 The county is over sixty percent African-American,
the median household income is a little over half that of the
Virginia average, and the percentage of persons living below the
poverty line remained above seventeen percent in 2006. These
figures are particularly significant when considered in tandem with
the fact that the waste industry so often emphasizes the economic
benefits that accrue to host communities as a result of siting a
mega-fill. One might wonder why the demographic figures in the
southeastern Virginia communities continue to remain in stark
contrast to the Virginia averages, since many of the southeastern
county mega-fills have been in operation since the 1990s,
including the Sussex mega-fill.
B. Economic Incentives for Host Communities
"Land-rich, cash-poor" communities like the mega-fill
counties in southeastern Virginia have an incentive to allow
landfills to site within their boundaries because "revenue from
landfills can help poor counties provide services and infrastructure
that they otherwise could not afford, given their tax base." 93 Waste
92 Chen, supra note 91.
93 Taylor, supra note 42, at A408.
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Management Inc., which owns mega-fills in Sussex, Charles City,
Gloucester, Amelia, King George, and Hampton, provided a
cumulative 21.3 million dollars in host fee payments to those
localities in 2006 alone, in addition to free disposal and recycling
services and local and state tax payments totaling over 800,000
dollars. 94  Revenue from the Charles City County mega-fill
allowed the county to build a new school system and industrial
park and cut taxes by forty percent. 95 Similarly, revenue from the
Sussex landfill allowed the county to hold taxes steady and build a
new courthouse, wastewater plant, and high school.96
While county officials often praise the mega-fills and they
revenue they provide, 97 some residents remain skeptical. In
interviews with the New York Times in 1999, residents of Sussex
County-home of Virginia's largest mega-fill-were generally
ambivalent. While worried about the potentially damaging
environmental hazards of the mega-fill, the residents still saw the
facility as a necessary source of revenue, for lack of other better
options. 98 In King and Queen County, members of a 128-year-old
church adjacent to a mega-fill had to stop holding outdoor picnics
because of the noise pollution, litter, and presence of buzzards and
seagulls on the property.
99
Regardless of the economic advantages that a mega-fill
may initially bring to a host community, the siting of such a
facility may not make long-term economic sense. At least one
environmental justice expert has argued that a locality with one
disposal facility can attract others and indirectly discourage cleaner
industries, restricting "a county's economic prospects without
providing offsetting advantages."'
100
94 DEQ SOLID WASTE REPORT, supra note 45, at 33.
95 Harden, supra note 6.
96 Chen, supra note 91.
97 See Harden, supra note 6.
98 Chen, supra note 91. One Sussex County resident remarked about the mega-
fill, "We'd rather not have it, but we're caught between a rock and a hard place,
because the county is in bad shape and we need the money." Id.
99 Lipton, supra note 69.
100 Taylor, supra note 42, at 414. Robert Bullard, Director of the Environmental
Justice Resource Center at Clark Atlanta University, also argues that most
disposal facilities "don't even hire people that live in the [host] community." Id.
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C. Political Disadvantages of Host Communities
The corporate trash industry has cultivated successful
alliances with local and state politicians throughout Virginia.
1 1
Efforts at the state level to limit the growth of the trash industry in
Virginia or to increase the scrutiny of the interstate trash enterprise
have failed, while bills to protect the industry's market have
succeeded. 10 2 Although politicians are quick to publicly bemoan
the transport of trash from New York to Virginia, many are
reluctant to turn their backs on some of their largest political
contributors. 10 3 Economic need may explain why so many rural
southeastern Virginia communities have been willing to site mega-
fills, but the political clout of the waste industry at least partly
explains why state leaders have not been particularly proactive in
protecting such communities from perceived environmental
inequalities. Both political and economic factors thus help explain
the proliferation of mega-fills in Virginia's southeastern
communities.
D. Environmental Justice Analysis
One might claim that the failure of poor communities to
oppose landfills is a manifestation of political powerlessness, 104 or
a result of a lack of informed knowledge and decision-making
about relevant environmental health risks.10 5 One could also argue
that such claims smack of paternalism, and that local officials in
the southeastern Virginia mega-fill counties are making informed,
economically-rational decisions when approving the siting of
101 Eric Lipton, Powerful Friends Help Trash Industry Protect Its Interests,
WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 1998, at Al.
02 Id. From 1993 to 1998, "at least thirteen bills were introduced in the Virginia
General Assembly that would have increased the state's role in managing
landfill construction, limited the transportation of trash in Virginia, or increased
the regulation of the trash-industry." All failed. Id.
103 See id.
104 See Lipton, supra note 69.
105 See, e.g., EDWARDO L. RHODES, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA: A
NEW PARADIGM (2003).
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mega-fills. Regardless, the statistical discrepancies and anecdotal
evidence outlined above raise significant questions concerning
who is dumping on whom in the interstate waste trade. The EPA
defines environmental justice as:
the fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all
people regardless of race, color, national origin,
culture, education, or income with respect to the
development, implementation, and enforcement of
environmental laws, regulations, and policies. Fair
treatment means that no group of people, including
racial, ethnic or socioeconomic groups, should bear
a disproportionate share of the negative
environmental consequences resulting from
industrial, municipal, and commercial operations or
the execution of federal, state, local, and tribal
environmental programs and policies. 1
06
Applying the EPA's definition, it is questionable whether
the southeastern Virginia landfill communities are receiving "fair
treatment." It is at least arguable that the racial and socioeconomic
groups populating the Virginia mega-fill counties are bearing a
disproportionate share of negative environmental consequences as
a result of a combination of federal and state policies and legal
doctrines that accommodate the interstate flow of garbage. While
the EPA's standard has no legal teeth that can transform this
problem into a remedy for those aggrieved, it is helpful because it
at least highlights a potentially problematic social consequence of
the interstate exchange of waste from New York to Virginia.
This conclusion does not mean to suggest that waste
companies target the "land-rich, cash-poor" southeastern Virginia
counties because of their racial or socioeconomic status. But it is
certainly worth pointing out that both RCRA and the Supreme
Court's garbage jurisprudence indirectly promote a market
environment in which corporate waste haulers are naturally
106 U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Frequently Asked Questions Environmental
Justice, http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/faqs/ej/index.html#faq2 (last
visited Apr. 24, 2009).
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attracted to poor, less-educated communities where it is cheaper
and politically easier to site a landfill. The daily influx of waste
from Maryland, New York, D.C., and other more affluent parts of
Virginia to the economically-strapped, politically powerless
southeastern counties is another example of the way in which a
relatively unrestrained interstate waste market can reap unintended,
negative social consequences, and yet another reason to consider
potential federal and state options for improving the current MSW
disposal regime.
VIII. FEDERAL OPTIONS TO IMPROVE MSW DISPOSAL
PRACTICES
The numerous negative environmental and social
externalities associated with the interstate transport of MSW from
New York to Virginia include groundwater contamination, noise
and air pollution, traffic safety hazards, and environmental justice
problems. In light of these concerns, the interstate transport of
waste presents a public policy problem worth addressing, at least
in certain cases. This Section will discuss a series of potential
federal solutions to address the problems described above.
A. HHW and E-waste Restrictions
To the extent that groundwater contamination problems are
created from the mixing and disposal of HHW and e-waste with
normal MSW, Congress could amend RCRA to require states to
implement HHW and e-waste segregation policies in their solid
waste management plans. States could then choose from an array
of different options to achieve segregation, depending on how
specific and restrictive Congress decided to be with its
amendments. Potential options might include: requiring
households to dispose of e-waste and HHW in separate bins (as
some localities require for recyclable materials), charging
households that fail to segregate such wastes to fund a post-
collection sorting process, or simply providing households with
2008-20091
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regularly available and publicized alternatives for the disposal of
such wastes. 1
0 7
The political viability of a federal waste segregation
requirement is debatable, as solid waste management is
traditionally the province of localities. But a general requirement
that would apply through the implementation and enforcement of
state solid waste management plans might provide states with
enough flexibility to avoid any major political push-back.
Furthermore, the implementation of a national requirement by way
of RCRA would be necessary to ensure that all states take
environmentally-protective measures by providing for the
segregation of harmful waste. For example, the purpose behind
this requirement would not be served if Virginia independently
passed such a requirement and New York did not, because New
York could still export its HHW-laced trash to Virginia landfills.
Action at the federal level would be necessary to ensure that this
requirement truly protects all MSW landfills from potential
hazardous substances and waste.
08
This proposal is necessary, but not sufficient, to address
some of the negative environmental externalities outlined in this
Note. Regardless of the relative "purity" of the MSW streams
flowing between states, the unfettered flow of trash from New
York to Virginia and elsewhere still brings with it other
environmental and social problems, including air pollution and
traffic hazards.
B. Congressional Authorization of State Limits on
MSW Imports
Numerous bills have been introduced in Congress that
would allow states to restrict the importation of out-of-state waste.
107 See, e.g., James DeLong, Of Mountains and Molehills: Solid Waste "Crisis",
BROOKINGS REV., Spring 1994, at 34 (arguing that HHW is "the one genuine
MSW problem [that] receives inadequate attention" and recommending some of
the policies suggested above).
108 While action at the federal level is most preferable, some states have banned
certain types of waste from the trash. See, e.g., Cal. Int'd Waste Mgmt. Bd.,
Wastes Banned from the Trash, http://www.ciwmb.ca.gov/HHW/Info (last
visited Apr. 24, 2009).
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Because Congress has the power to regulate commerce between
the states under the Commerce Clause, it can allow states to restrict
the flow of waste to whatever extent it chooses. The Solid Waste
Transportation Act of 2007 is just one example of a bill that
Congress could choose to adopt. 10 9 The bill authorizes states to set
limits on the amount of out-of-state MSW received annually for
disposal at landfill facilities. 110 This form of legislation, however,
might inadvertently stunt the interstate waste market in cases
where it need not be restricted. For example, if Virginia decided to
exercise the discretion to limit waste imports after being granted
the congressional authorization to do so, then it would be limiting
imports from Maryland, D.C., and New York alike. State
boundaries, however, should not be the deciding factor when
restricting the interstate exchange of waste. As a practical matter,
much of the waste shipped from Maryland and D.C. into Virginia
probably travels less distance than waste shipped from one
Virginia county to another. It would not be sound public policy to
give states carte blanche to restrict the waste market, especially
when such waste comes from neighboring jurisdictions.
Virginia should, however, be given the authority to address
some of the major environmental and social problems outlined
above by restricting the flow of garbage coming from New York
and other far-away, non-border-state jurisdictions. Granted, the
long-distance, multi-state transport of garbage on the scale of New
York to Virginia entails the same externalities as does the transport
of garbage within Virginia. But those externalities are of a much
larger degree and consequently warrant some level of market
interference. In the case of long distance, multi-state
transportation, millions more miles are traveled on the highways
by trash haulers, increasing air pollution and the risk of traffic
accidents. This form of large-scale trash transport also erodes a
layer of accountability between waste managers and producers,
and increases the chances that illegal hazardous or otherwise
harmful waste could be disposed of in a receiving landfill. It could
also be argued that this exchange only fuels the environmental
109 H.R. 274, 110th Cong. (2007).
110 The limitation amount is set at the amount received during 1993, or during
1995 if the state has a comprehensive statewide recycling program. Id.
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justice problems associated with the interstate transport of waste to
southeastern Virginia landfills. All of these reasons warrant some
form of intervention that would permit states like Virginia to
curtail the long distance, multi-state transport of waste.
C. Regional Interstate MSW Compacts
Regional interstate MSW compacts might be a step in the
right direction towards addressing some of the specific problems
described above. Using the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy
Act of 1980 as a model, Congress could authorize regional
interstate MSW compacts whereby states could join together in a
partnership to prohibit the importation of solid waste generated by
non-member states. III In order to allow states the time to build up
sufficient disposal capacity within their own borders, Congress
could first allow compact states to charge graduated disposal rates
on out-of-state waste shipments over several years, and then
eventually permit the compact states to ban the import of waste
generated in states outside the compact's region.1 12 For example,
under this proposal, Maryland, D.C., Virginia, and North Carolina
could enter into an interstate MSW compact. Once approved by
Congress, the states would be able to impose graduated surcharges
on waste from out-of-state sources and then eventually cut off all
shipments of MSW from states outside the compact without
violating the dormant Commerce Clause. This solution is
preferable because it would permit the continued flow of waste
within the natural Maryland-Virginia-D.C. "wasteshed" but would
also allow Virginia to minimize the severity of the negative
externalities associated with the export of waste from New York to
Virginia.
One potential problem with the interstate compact solution
is that there would be no guarantee that every state would be able
to enter into a compact. If New York's neighbors, for example,
entered into a compact to the exclusion of New York, then the state
111 See, e.g., Kirsten Engel, Reconsidering the National Market in Solid Waste:
Trade-offs in Equity, Efficiency, Environmental Protection, and State Autonomy,
73 N.C. L. REv. 1481, 1486 (1995).112 Id. at 1555.
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would end up either expanding its own capacity or exporting its
trash to places perhaps further away than Virginia. If New York
expanded its own disposal capacity, however, the negative
externalities associated with transport would be minimized. But if
the state decided to ship its MSW even further away, the negative
externalities associated with transport would be magnified. So, to
the extent that the interstate compact solution might work to the
exclusion of New York or other super-exporting states, there is a
chance that the same problems outlined in this Note could just be
magnified.
However, it is worth noting that in either of the above
scenarios (New York expanding its own disposal capacity or
exporting to states further away than Virginia), the costs of MSW
disposal for New Yorkers would increase. This effect might
encourage New Yorkers to reduce waste production and recycle
more, thus reducing the overall demand for trash exportation by
the state. Furthermore, the semi-restricted market created by
interstate MSW compacts (should states choose to create them)
could always be corrected by Congress in the event that gross
inefficiencies resulted.
D. Altering the EPA's Criteria for Approving State
Waste Plans
Finally, Congress could address some of the environmental
justice questions associated with the interstate transport of MSW
by revising the EPA's criteria for the approval of state solid waste
management plans under RCRA. For example, states could be
required to include a program in their solid waste plans that takes
into account the potential socioeconomic or racial effects of
landfill siting and permitting decisions. 113  If a state failed to
institute a program to take these effects into consideration, then the
EPA could reject the plan and withhold essential federal
financing. 114
113 Paula Murray & David Spence, Fair Weather Federalism and America's
Waste Disposal Crisis, 27 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 71, 75-76 (2003).
114 Id.
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One obvious difficulty with imposing such a requirement is
that it is not clear exactly how states would take potential
socioeconomic and racial effects of siting and permitting decisions
into account. Such a requirement would also be hard to enforce
because it would be very difficult to evaluate whether state
officials took such considerations into account and, if so, how
strongly they weighed them. One tangible requirement that could
be enforced in a state solid waste plan would be a rule guarding
against cumulative environmental effects from multiple disposal
facilities. The EPA, for example, could set threshold criteria for
exactly how many waste disposal facilities a specific community
could accept, perhaps based on its geographic and demographic
characteristics. A county with a small population but a large
amount of land, for example, might be prohibited from accepting
more than one landfill facility over a certain size. This would help
protect communities against the phenomenon whereby a locality
with one disposal facility tends to attract other similar disposal
facilities and indirectly discourages cleaner and more profitable
industries.
IX. STATE OPTIONS TO IMPROVE MSW DISPOSAL PRACTICES
A. More Stringent State Regulation of MSW Landfills
Virginia and other importing states might decrease the flow
of out-of-state waste by revising their state landfill regulations to
require new landfills to have double composite liners and
secondary leachate collection systems, like New York. This could
increase the cost of landfilling in-state and potentially decrease the
amount of waste arriving from out-of-state sources. More stringent
requirements, when implemented, would also provide greater
protection against potential leaching and subsequent groundwater
contamination.
Aside from the fact that this option may not be politically
viable, it would not do anything to address the risks stemming
from the many currently-operating landfills throughout the state.
Landfill liners and leachate collection systems cannot be
retrofitted, and many of Virginia's landfills are expected to last
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well over a decade."l 5 By themselves, new and stricter landfill
regulations would not go very far towards minimizing the many
environmental risks illuminated above.
To the extent that Virginians are concerned with the
prospect of illegal and harmful waste arriving unaccounted for in
MSW streams from New York, Virginia could revise its landfill
regulations to provide for more frequent inspections by local or
DEQ staff. The state could also provide funding for DEQ
monitoring and sampling of groundwater wells and thus remove its
current reliance on corporate waste companies to perform such
functions. Increased inspections and oversight coupled with
increased penalties for violations would give waste haulers a much
stronger incentive to self-regulate and dispose of all waste in a
proper manner.
Random inspections of trash haulers could also be
increased along the interstate highways of Virginia and other states
along the east cost. After Pennsylvania experienced problems with
trash haulers importing illegal types of waste into MSW landfills,
the state set up a special inspection program, which doubled the
number of surprise inspections on the state's highways. 116  To
prevent the improper disposal of harmful waste in MSW landfills,
Virginia could increase highway inspections like Pennsylvania did
and perhaps even pass a law banning waste haulers from traveling
on Virginia highways after repeated failed inspections.
Finally, to the extent that Virginians are concerned with the
proliferation of mega-fills in the state, the General Assembly could
pass a special mega-fill statute similar to Montana's Mega-Landfill
Act, which authorizes a large fee for all waste company permits for
landfills over a designated size.117 Money collected from the
permit fee could be held by the state as a form of assurance to be
used when environmental problems occur and consequently
require remediation. The statute could also authorize a private
right of action for damages to the water supply surrounding a
mega-fill, thus ensuring aggrieved adjacent landowners of a future
115 DEQ SOLID WASTE REPORT, supra note 45, at 30-31. Most of the mega-fills
are expected to last another twenty to ninety years. Id.
116 Lipton, supra note 69.
117 MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-10-920 (2007).
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remedy. The statute might also require the DEQ to consider the
racial and socioeconomic composition of a host community in its
siting decision, including the particularized impacts on the
population living immediately adjacent to the mega-fill. While it
would be difficult to articulate to DEQ staff just how heavily to
weigh such considerations in relation to other factors, it would at
least be a step in a direction towards assuring some sensitivity to
environmental justice issues.
B. Regulation of HHW and Oregon Waste Systems
As mentioned above, a uniform federal approach to the
regulation of HHW in all states is preferable to piecemeal
regulation by different states. But it should be noted that in the
absence of any of the federal action proposed above, a state still
might be able to safeguard its landfills and stem the flow of out-of-
state waste by individually regulating the disposal of HHW and
other harmful waste in MSW landfills. Oregon Waste Systems
provides a potential angle for this opportunity.
To recall, in Oregon Waste Systems, the Supreme Court
struck down an Oregon law that imposed a surcharge on the
disposal of out-of-state solid waste. 118 The Court struck down the
law as per se invalid as a form of facial discrimination against
interstate commerce, noting that Oregon made no showing that the
disposal of waste from other jurisdictions imposed higher costs on
the state or that such waste contained any safety or health risks
unique from that of Oregon's solid waste.119
Under the above rubric, a state concerned with the
inundation of out-of-state garbage might consider banning the
disposal of HHW and e-waste with the normal MSW stream and
levying a surcharge on the disposal of waste from other
jurisdictions that do not similarly regulate HHW or e-waste. 120 In
118 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
119 Id. at 101.
120 Fort Gratiot may also provide support for this proposition. In striking down
a Michigan law that prohibited any person from accepting for disposal any solid
waste that was not generated in the locality in which the disposal area was
located unless the acceptance of such waste was specifically authorized in the
locality's approved solid waste management plan, the Supreme Court relied on
THE POLITICS OF TRASH
Oregon Waste Systems, if Oregon regulated HHW and e-waste at
the time, and if the importing states did not, then Oregon may have
successfully met the Court's burden of showing that: a) the
disposal of waste from other jurisdictions imposed higher costs on
Oregon than the disposal of its own waste because the HHW and e-
waste contained in out-of-state MSW required more expensive
environmental controls and more frequent and costly agency
inspections, and b) out-of-state MSW was fundamentally different
from Oregon's MSW because it contained potentially hazardous
forms of waste. The Court might have accepted these reasons in
support of a conclusion that such a surcharge, if levied by a state
that segregates HHW and e-waste, is not facially discriminatory.121
California recently banned forms of HHW from the trash,
including light bulbs, batteries, electronics, paints, solvents,
antifreeze, and building materials like asbestos and treated
wood. 122 If the state tried to impose surcharges upon the import of
waste from neighboring states that do not regulate HHW, then its
effort might survive under the rubric of Oregon Waste Systems.
States, however, would probably be unlikely to take such a leap of
faith given the likely litigation costs and court battles that would
ensue from a challenge by commercial waste haulers.
C. Flow Control to a Publicly-Owned & Operated
Waste Authority
After Oneida-Herkimer, it is clear that a locality may pass a
flow control ordinance that directs all solid waste generated within
its borders to be first delivered to a publicly-operated solid waste
the fact that Michigan failed to provide any reasons as to why out-of-county
solid waste should be treated any differently than waste generated within a
county. 504 U.S. 353 (1992). A law prohibiting the import of solid waste from
states without HHW or e-waste disposal restrictions could be justified by a state
imposing such restrictions on the grounds that out-of-state waste is of a
categorically different character and risk than normal MSW.
121 If so, then the second prong of the Pike test would apply. See 511 U.S. at 99
("nondiscriminatory regulations that have only incidental effects on interstate
commerce are valid unless 'the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."' (quoting Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970))).
122 See Cal. Int'd Waste Mgmt. Bd., supra note 108.
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authority.' 2 3  Thus, to combat some of the problems outlined
above, a locality could take control of the disposal of MSW within
its borders by setting up a publicly-run solid waste authority and
requiring all solid waste generated within the locality to be
disposed of or processed by the authority. It could also charge
high-rate tipping fees on waste brought to the authority by private
waste collectors, thus discouraging imports. Taking such measures
would ensure a locality a high degree of autonomy over the
disposal of solid waste within its borders and either decrease the
amount of solid waste brought to the authority or increase the
locality's revenues because of the higher fees charged on waste
from private collectors.
X. CONCLUSION
The Virginia-New York garbage dispute is just one
example of the way in which the unrestrained market for interstate
waste has created significant environmental and social problems.
RCRA, which promotes the proliferation of mega-fills, and the
Supreme Court's dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which
promotes the interstate transport of MSW, help foster an
environmentally unsound, inefficient, unsustainable, and
sometimes unfair waste management market in the United States.
While the interstate exchange of MSW makes practical sense in
many situations, states should be given more authority to curtail
such exchange when conducted on a long-distance, multi-state
scale.
In the absence of congressional action, states are fairly
limited in available options for limiting trash imports. But several
solutions could go a long way towards striking the appropriate
balance between state autonomy, environmental quality, and a
robust interstate MSW market. At the federal level, Congress
could require states to provide for the segregation of HHW and e-
waste in their solid waste management plans. This would ensure
that hazardous and harmful waste is disposed of in an
environmentally sound manner and also reduce the risk of
groundwater contamination from MSW landfills in the future. It
123 550 U.S. 330 (2007).
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would also protect importing states from receiving potentially
hazardous materials from states that export their garbage. In
tandem with such a measure, Congress could also grant states the
permission to enter into interstate waste compacts. These
compacts would give member states the authority to completely
exclude the import of waste from non-compact states. A compact
between Maryland, D.C., Virginia, and North Carolina, for
example, would permit Virginia to stop the trend of MSW imports
from New York while assuring a robust enough market for waste
to keep disposal costs relatively cheap for citizens.
To the extent that a state is concerned with the proliferation
of landfills within its boundaries, it could require more frequent
trash hauler and landfill inspections and groundwater sampling by
agency staff. It could also impose special fees applicable to
corporate waste companies that could be used to fund
environmental remediation efforts if and when contamination
occurs.
To address potential environmental justice problems, states
could consider requiring agency staff to consider the potential
socioeconomic and racial effects of siting decisions on host
communities-for example, creating criteria that prevent localities
from accepting over a certain threshold number of waste facilities.
Imposing such a requirement could potentially prevent
communities from becoming magnets for landfills or other waste
facilities after allowing one facility to be constructed. In the
absence of any of the congressional action recommended above, a
state might also consider requiring the segregation of HHW and e-
waste. This might give it a potential legal justification for
imposing graduated fees on the disposal of out-of-state waste that
is not regulated in a similar fashion.
Identifying some of the negative environmental and social
problems associated with the interstate transport of MSW is
relatively easy, but finding practical and politically feasible
solutions is not. Hopefully, this Note makes a few steps in the
right direction by proposing some solutions that would have
positive environmental and social consequences while preserving a
relatively robust interstate MSW market.
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